CRS Report for Congress

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Summary

This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past aid programs, data on annual assistance, and an analysis of current issues. The report will be updated annually to reflect developments over the previous year. For the most recent action on aid to Israel, see CRS Report RL33476, *Israel: Background and Relations with the United States*, by Carol Migdalovitz. For information on overall U.S. assistance to the Middle East, see CRS Report RL32260, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2008 Request*, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. From 1976-2004, Israel was the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, having recently been supplanted by Iraq. Since 1985, the United States has provided nearly \$3 billion in grants annually to Israel.

Over the years, Israel has developed an advanced industrial economy which, according to the World Bank, places it among the top 50 richest nations in terms of per capita income (between Cyprus and Slovenia respectively). With Israel becoming more economically self-sufficient, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a joint session of Congress in 1996 that Israel's need for economic aid would be reduced over time. In 1998, Israel proposed gradually eliminating the \$1.2 billion economic aid and increasing the \$1.8 billion in military aid by \$60 million per year over a 10-year period beginning in the year 2000. Subsequent appropriations for Israel included cuts of approximately \$120 million in economic aid and increases of \$60 million in military aid each fiscal year.

Strong congressional support for Israel has resulted in Israel's receiving benefits that may not be available to other countries. For example, Israel can use U.S. military assistance both for research and development in the United States and for military purchases from Israeli manufacturers. In addition, all U.S. foreign assistance earmarked for Israel is delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year. Most other recipients normally receive their aid in installments. Congress also appropriates funds for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs.

In August 2007, the Bush Administration announced that it would increase U.S. military assistance to Israel by \$6 billion over the next decade. The agreement calls for incremental annual increases in FMF to Israel, reaching \$3.1 billion a year in the near future. The Administration has requested \$2.4 billion in military assistance and no economic aid for Israel in FY2008. H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 provides the full Administration request.

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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

U.S.-Israeli Relations and the Role of Foreign Aid

For decades, the United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on a number of factors, including strong domestic U.S. support for Israel; shared strategic goals in the Middle East (concern over Iran, Syria, Islamic extremism); shared democratic values; and historic ties dating back to U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. economic and military aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties. Although there have been occasional differences over Israel's settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (prior to the 2005 disengagement) and Israeli arms sales to China, successive Administrations and many lawmakers have long considered Israel to be a reliable partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this sentiment.

U.S. military aid has helped transform Israel's armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world. U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel's qualitative edge over neighboring militaries, since Israel must rely on better equipment and training to compensate for a manpower deficit in any potential regional conflict. U.S. military aid, a portion of which may be spent on procurement from Israeli defense companies, also has helped Israel to build a domestic defense industry, which ranks as one of the top ten suppliers of arms worldwide.

For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, though since the rapid expansion of Israel's hi-tech sector in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation), Israel is now considered a fully industrialized nation with an economy on par with some Western European countries. Consequently, Israel and the United States agreed to gradually phase out grant economic aid to Israel. In FY2008, Israel will no longer receive bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) grants. It had been a large-scale recipient of grant ESF assistance since 1971.

The use of foreign aid to help accelerate the Middle East peace process has had mixed results. The promise of U.S. assistance to Israel and Egypt during peace negotiations in the late 1970s enabled both countries to take the risks needed for peace, and may have helped convince them that the United States was committed to supporting their peace efforts. Promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace has proven to be a far greater challenge for U.S. policy makers, as most analysts consider foreign aid to be tangential in solving complex territorial issues and overcoming deeply rooted mistrust sown over decades.

Critics of U.S. aid policy, particularly some in the Middle East, argue that U.S. foreign aid exacerbates tensions in the region. Many Arab commentators insist that

U.S. assistance to Israel indirectly causes suffering to Palestinians by supporting Israeli arms purchases. In the past, the United States reduced loan guarantees to Israel in opposition to continued settlement building, but it has not acted to cut Israel's military or economic grant aid.

A New 10-Year Military Aid Agreement

In August 2007, the Bush Administration announced that it would increase U.S. military assistance to Israel by \$6 billion over the next decade. For FY2008, Israel is receiving \$2.4 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The agreement calls for incremental annual increases in FMF to Israel, reaching \$3.1 billion a year by FY2018. Egypt, traditionally the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the Middle East, will receive no corresponding increase in U.S. military assistance over the same ten-year period. Military analysts speculate that the increase in U.S. assistance will facilitate potential Israeli purchases of the most sophisticated U.S. equipment, including a possible sale of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Under the terms of the agreement, Israel will still be able to spend 26% of U.S. assistance on Israelimanufactured equipment. According to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, who signed the Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Military Assistance:

We consider this 30 billion dollars in assistance to Israel to be an investment in peace in long-term peace. Peace will not be made without strength. Peace will not be made without Israel being strong in the future. Of course, our objective as a country and our specific objective as a government is to contribute to that peace, a peace between Israel and the Palestinian people, the creation of an independent Palestinian state willing to live side by side in peace with Israel, and a general peace in the region that has eluded the Israeli people for 59 years but which is, we hope, the destiny of the Israeli people as well as the Arab peoples of the region. Our policy in this entire region is dedicated to that final objective.³

The Administration timed the announcement of the new ten-year aid agreement to coincide with a separate deal to sell additional sophisticated weaponry to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Since then, U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed that U.S. policy toward Israel is based on maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge over its Arab neighbors. Nevertheless, there is some concern in Congress over

¹ During negotiations over the new aid agreement, Israel had wanted a larger portion of FMF up front. The Administration insisted, however, that because there was limited additional funding in the foreign aid budget for large increases in military assistance, the United States lacked the fiscal flexibility to dramatically increase Israel's aid all at once. Ultimately, the Administration's incremental approach won out.

² In October 2007, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the United States had agreed to supply the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to Israel as early as 2012. According to one anonymous defense official quoted in the report, "This plane can fly into downtown Tehran without anyone even knowing about it since it can't be detected on radar." See, "Israel could get U.S.-made F-35 jets by 2012: Report," *Reuters*, October 25, 2007.

³ R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Remarks and Press Availability at Signing Ceremony for Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Military Assistance," Released by the American Embassy Tel Aviv – Press Section, August 16, 2007.

the possible sale to Saudi Arabia of precision-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), which were sold to Israel in 2007. Israel historically has opposed U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; however, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed some support for the Saudi arms deal when he remarked in July 2007, "We understand the need of the United States to support the Arab moderate states and there is a need for a united front between the U.S. and us regarding Iran."

U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

Overview. Congress has taken measures to strengthen Israel's security and maintain its "qualitative military edge" over neighboring militaries. Annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Israel represent over 20% of the overall Israeli defense budget, and FMF levels are expected to increase incrementally from a baseline of \$2.4 billion in FY2008 to approximately \$3.1 billion over the next several fiscal years.

Early Transfer. Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump sum during the first month of the fiscal year. Once disbursed, Israel's military aid is transferred to an interest bearing account with the Federal Reserve Bank. Israel has used interest collected on its military aid to pay down its debt (non-guaranteed) to the United States, which, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, stood at \$1.2 billion as of December 2005.⁴ Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel.

FMF for in-Country Purchase. Most analysts consider Israel's ability to use a significant portion of its annual military aid for procurement spending in Israel to be a valuable aspect of its assistance package; no other recipient of U.S. military assistance has been granted this benefit.⁵ The proceeds to Israeli defense firms from purchases with U.S. funds have allowed the Israeli defense industry to achieve necessary economies of scale and produce highly sophisticated equipment for niche markets. Defense experts note that high annual amounts of U.S. military assistance force private and semi-private Israeli defense companies to place a greater business emphasis on exports, since a large portion of Israeli government weapons

⁴ U.S. Department of Treasury Foreign Credit Reporting System, 2005.

⁵ Israel was first granted FMF for use in Israel in 1977, when it asked for and received permission to use \$107 million in FY1977 FMF funds to develop the Merkava tank (prototype completed in 1975 and added to Israeli arsenal in 1979). Several years later, Israel asked for a similar waiver to develop the Lavi ground-attack aircraft, and Congress responded with legislation allowing Israel to spend \$250 million of FMF in Israel to develop the Lavi. It was estimated that the United States provided between \$1.3 and \$1.8 billion in Lavi development costs before the United States and Israel agreed to terminate the project in 1988. In order to defray the cancellation costs of the Lavi program, the United States agreed to raise the FMF earmark for procurement in Israel to \$400 million. For background on the cancellation of the Lavi fighter, see Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israeli Alliance*, New York: Hyperion, 1994, pp. 263-268.

procurement is spent on American equipment. According to Beth McCormick, acting director of the U.S. Defense Technology Security Administration, Israeli manufacturers must sell as much as 75% of their output abroad to stay profitable, a far higher share than U.S. military contractors. Successive Administrations and many lawmakers believe that a strong domestic Israeli defense industry is crucial to maintaining Israel's technological edge over its neighbors. Israel is among the world's leading arms exporters. In 2006, it was the 9th leading supplier of arms worldwide.

Since FY1988, the FMF procurement earmark for purchases within Israel has been incorporated into annual foreign assistance legislation. Currently, approximately one quarter of Israel's FMF funds may be used for domestic defense purchases (\$631.2 million in FY2008). As U.S. military aid to Israel has increased, the amount set aside for defense purchases in Israel also has increased.

Recent U.S. Military Sales to Israel. Israel uses almost 75% of its FMF funds to purchase U.S. defense equipment. By law, Congress must be notified of any new purchase agreement. The Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is charged with managing U.S. arms sales to Israel. Recent sales include the following:

- On October 29, 2007, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Israel of missiles and munitions as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.329 billion. Israel requested the sale in order to replenish its stocks after its 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The possible sale includes 100 anti-ballistic missile Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile Plus; 1,700 Hellfire missiles in three variants; 2,014 TOW 2A radio frequency missiles of two kinds; 5,000 M141 83mm bunker defeat munitions, and more than 280,000 cartridges of various types. Raytheon and Hellfire Systems LLC would be the primary contractors.
- On August 24, 2007, DSCA notified Congress of three possible Foreign Military Sales to Israel. The first proposal was for JP-8 Aviation Jet and Diesel fuel. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$308 million. The second notification was for a possible sale to Israel of Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles (AMRAAM). The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$171 million. Raytheon would be the primary contractor. Finally, the third notification was for the sale of Harpoon anti-ship and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$163 million. The Boeing Company and Raytheon would be the primary contractors.

⁶ "Pentagon says Israel improves arms-export controls," *Reuters*, September 5, 2007.

⁷ CRS Report RL34187, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations*, 1999-2006, by Richard Grimmett.

 On August 3, 2007, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Israel of various munitions and weapon systems, including 10,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) tail kits and GBU-28 bunker buster bombs. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$465 million.

In April 1998, the United States designated Israel as a "major non-NATO ally," which qualifies Israel to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. DSCA manages the EDA program, which enables the U.S. to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or at no charge.⁸

Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs

Congress and successive Administrations have shown strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense projects. U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation has perennially been authorized and appropriated in the defense authorization and appropriations bills. Missile defense cooperation is generally not considered a form of direct aid, but many U.S. and Israeli observers consider it a vital component of the Israel's strategic relationship with the United States. Israel and the United States each financially contribute to several projects and share technology from co-developed weapons systems.

P.L.110-116, the FY2008 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, provides a total of \$155.5 million for U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs. The President had requested \$81 million in funding for FY2008.

Multi-Layered Missile Defense

Over the past several years, U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation has evolved to include the co-development of several systems designed to thwart a diverse range of threats, from short-range missiles and rockets fired by non-state groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, to middle and long-range ballistic missiles in Syria and Iran's

⁸ To access DSCA's Excess Defense Articles database, see [http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda/search.asp].

⁹ Beginning in 1996, the United States and Israel funded a short-range, anti-rocket program called the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL). Technical difficulties and financial disagreements with the prime contractor, TRW, over cost overruns plagued the program. Ultimately, after the United States and Israel invested between \$300 and \$400 million in the program (\$139 million in U.S. contributions), defense experts concluded that the THEL prototype, although effective against rockets and mortars, was too expensive and immobile a solution. According to one analyst, "shooting the laser just once would have cost roughly \$3,000, and that protecting the whole border of Israel would have required a few dozen of these systems."The program was terminated in September 2005, but then revived a year later (continued...)

arsenals. ¹⁰ Israel also possesses U.S.-supplied Hawk and Patriot missile batteries. In addition to joint programs, Israel has its own missile defense programs. Israel is currently developing a short-range system dubbed "Iron Dome" to destroy crude, Palestinian-made rockets fired by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Iron Dome is designed to intercept very short-range threats up to 40 kilometers in all-weather situations.

David's Sling. David's Sling is a short/medium-range system designed to counter rockets and missiles, such as those possessed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, fired at ranges from 40 km to 300 km. It is being jointly developed by Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon. The system is expected to be operable by 2010. P.L.110-116 provides \$37 million for a short range missile defense program.

The Arrow and Arrow II. Since 1988, Israel and the United States have been developing the Arrow Anti-Missile System, a weapon with a theater ballistic missile defense capability. The United States has funded just under half of the annual costs of the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel supplying just over half of the annual costs. The Arrow II program, a joint effort of Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), is designed to defeat longer-range conventional ballistic missiles. Of the total \$155 million provided for U.S.-Israeli missile defense in the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L.110-116), \$98 million is allocated for the Arrow II program, of which "\$37,383,000 shall be available for the purpose of producing Arrow missile components in the United States and Arrow missile components and missiles in Israel."

A High Altitude Missile Defense System? Fearing a potential nuclear threat from Iran, Israel has sought a missile interceptor that operates at a higher altitude and greater range than the Arrow. P.L.110-116 provides \$20 million for "risk mitigation and preliminary design activities for an upper-tier component to the Israeli Missile Defense Architecture." In October 2007, the United States and Israel agreed to establish a committee to evaluate Israel's proposed "Arrow-3," a top-tier system designed to intercept advanced missiles with nuclear-tipped warheads.

⁹ (...continued)

by Northrop Grumman which created "Skyguard," a more powerful version of the THEL. Nevertheless, Israel's Ministry of Defense believes that Skyguard does not function optimally in bad weather. See, "U.S. and Israel Shelved Laser As a Defense," *New York Times*, July 30, 2006.

¹⁰ In the mid 1990s, the U.S. Air Force analyzed alternatives for a theater missile defense system that could intercept missiles shortly after launch, when they are the most vulnerable. In June 1997, the United States and Israel began a joint research program to develop a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could deliver weapons that would intercept ballistic missiles immediately after launch (boost phase). In late 1999, apparently because of the complexities of the technology involved and disagreements between the United States and Israel over the potential merits of the system, Israel decided not to move toward full demonstration of the Boost Phase Intercept system. Congress provided a total of \$53 million for the Boost Phase Intercept program.

Table 1. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense: FY2006-FY2008

(\$ in millions)

System Type	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008
Short-Range	\$10.0	\$20.4	\$37.0
Arrow	\$122.866	\$117.494	\$98.572
High Altitude	_	_	\$20.0
Total	\$132.866	\$137.894	\$155.572

Aid Restrictions and Possible Violations

Cluster Munitions

Although U.S. assistance to Israel has remained high for several decades, there have been some instances when the United States acted to restrict aid or rebuke Israel for possible improper use of U.S.-supplied military equipment. The 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent arms agreements between Israel and the United States limit the use of U.S. military equipment to defensive purposes. The Arms Export Control Act states that the United States may stop aid to countries which use U.S. military assistance for purposes other than "legitimate self-defense." In 1982, the Reagan Administration determined that Israel "may" have violated its 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States by reportedly using U.S.-supplied anti-personnel cluster bombs against civilian targets during its military operations in Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. As a result, the Reagan Administration prohibited U.S. export of cluster bombs to Israel for six years.

During the July-August 2006 war in Lebanon, Israel used cluster munitions to counter Hezbollah rocket attacks. The United States apparently supplied some of the cluster weapons that Israel used in the conflict.¹³ Since the August 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah cease-fire, there have been a number of reported Lebanese civilian deaths

¹¹ See, CRS Report RL30982, U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on Their Use, by Richard Grimmett.

¹² The Reagan Administration also temporarily suspended the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Israel after it bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981.

¹³ David S. Cloud, "Inquiry Opened Into Israeli Use Of U.S. Bombs," *New York Times* August 25, 2006. An August 26, 2006, presentation by United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMAS) South Lebanon office catalogued the following numbers of U.S.-manufactured cluster weapon sub-munitions during surveys in southern Lebanon (source weapons in parentheses): 715 M-42's (105-millimeter artillery shells), 820 M-77's (M-26 rockets), and 5 BLU-63's (CBU-26 cluster bombs). The UNMAS teams also reported 631 M-85 Israeli-produced sub-munitions had been found. See, UNMAS South Lebanon, "Cluster Bomb Situation - South Lebanon July/August 2006," August 26, 2006.

and injuries from unexploded bomb remnants spread across a wide area of southern Lebanon. After the war, the U.S. Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement implemented a landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) humanitarian clearance program in Lebanon.

The Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls reportedly conducted an investigation focused on whether Israel violated confidential agreements with the United States that restrict Israel's use of U.S.-supplied cluster munitions to certain military targets in non-civilian areas. On January 28, 2007, the State Department issued a preliminary report to Congress concluding that Israel may have violated the terms of classified U.S.-Israeli procurement agreements on the use of cluster bombs in populated areas. According to State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, "There were likely violations," though he added that "This is a preliminary finding and because it also involves the agreements about use (of munitions), which are classified, I cannot get into the details." The State Department has reportedly asked Israel for additional information on reports that Israeli troops violated orders that restricted how U.S.-manufactured cluster bombs could be used during the summer 2006 war. 15

In December 2007, the IDF concluded its investigation into its 2006 use of cluster bombs stating that "It was clear that the majority of the cluster munitions were fired at open and uninhabited areas, areas from which Hezbollah forces operated and in which no civilians were present....The use of this weaponry was legal once it was determined that, in order to prevent rocket fire onto Israel, its use was a concrete military necessity." The IDF also announced that it would not press charges against officers who ordered the use of cluster bombs during the 2006 war.

H.R. 2764, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations bill, would significantly restrict the export of U.S.-manufactured cluster munitions. Section 646 (b) of the bill states that "no military assistance shall be furnished for cluster munitions, no defense export license for cluster munitions may be issued, and no cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology shall be sold or transferred, unless (1) the submunitions of the cluster munitions have a 99 percent or higher tested rate; and (2) the agreement applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of the cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology specifies that the cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present."

On September 6, 2007, the President objected to efforts by lawmakers to ban the export of cluster munitions. In a statement of Administration policy, the President wrote "The Administration also objects to restrictions on providing military

¹⁴ "U.S. Says Israel May Have Violated Agreement on Cluster Bomb Use," *Reuters*, January 29, 2007.

¹⁵ "Israel May have Violated Arms Pact, U.S. Says," New York Times, January 28, 2007.

assistance for cluster munitions.... Currently, the sales of cluster munitions are subject to safeguards.¹⁶

Israeli Arms Sales to China

Over the last two decades, the United States and Israel have disagreed over Israeli sales of sensitive U.S. technologies to China. U.S. objections have largely been communicated by successive Administrations and Pentagon officials, though in recent years, some Members of Congress expressed dissatisfaction over one reported sale. In 2000, Representative Sonny Callahan, former Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, sought to withhold \$250 million in aid to Israel unless it cancelled a planned sale to China of an Airborne Early Warning System. On June 20, 2000, the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee voted nine to six to defeat Callahan's proposal. In 2005, the United States suspended Israel from participating in the development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and imposed other restrictions in defense ties because of Israeli plans to upgrade Chinese Harpy Killer drone aircraft. Israel ultimately canceled the sale.

In order to create a more transparent arms transfer process, former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz signed a 2005 bilateral agreement mandating Israeli consultation with the U.S. government on sensitive arms transfers to third parties. The Israeli government also has established its own arms export controls agency to supervise military sales. In 2006, Israel reportedly froze a \$100-million contract with Venezuela to upgrade its U.S.-manufactured F-16 fighter jets due to U.S. pressure. According to one former U.S. official, "We don't officially acknowledge our supervisory role or our de facto veto right over their exports.... It's a matter of courtesy to our Israeli friends, who are very serious about their sovereignty and in guarding their reputation on the world market." 19

Israeli Settlements

Continued Israeli settlement building led the United States to reduce the amount of loans it has extended to Israel. By law, U.S. loan guarantees cannot be used to finance Israeli settlement building in areas occupied after the 1967 War. In the mid-1990s and then again in 2003, the United States reduced loan guarantees to Israel by

¹⁶ "Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2764 – State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008," Office of Management and Budget, September 6, 2007.

¹⁷ Eric Pianin, "Israel-China Radar Deal Opposed," Washington Post, April 7, 2000.

¹⁸ According to the House Committee, "the Committee is very disturbed by reports that Israel is preparing to provide China with an airborne radar system that could threaten both the forces of democratic Taiwan and the United States in the region surrounding the Taiwan Strait. The Committee intends to revisit this issue as the appropriations process moves forward." H.Rept. 106-720, accompanying H.R. 4811 (P.L. 106-429), the FY2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

¹⁹ "U.S. OKs Israel-China Spy Sat Deal," *DefenseNews.com*, October 12, 2007.

an amount equal to Israel's estimated spending on settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Other Ongoing Assistance and Cooperative Programs

Migration & Refugee Assistance

Beginning in 1973, Israel has received grants from the State Department's Migration and Refugee Assistance fund (MRA)²⁰ to assist in the resettlement of humanitarian migrants to Israel. Funds are paid to the United Israel Appeal, private philanthropic organization in the United States, which in turn transfers the funds to the Jewish Agency.²¹ Between 1973 and 1991, the United States gave about \$460 million for resettling Jewish refugees in Israel. Annual amounts have varied from a low of \$12 million to a high of \$80 million, based on the number of Jews leaving the former Soviet Union and other

Migration and Refugee Assistance Funding Levels

FY2000: \$60 million FY2001: \$60 million \$60 million FY2003: FY2004: \$59.6 million FY2005: \$49.7 million FY2006: \$50 million FY2007 \$40 million FY2008: \$40 million

Source: U.S. State Department.

Note: The level of funding reflects a decline in need due to the overall decreasing numbers of migrants to Israel.

areas for Israel. The Refugee and Migration funds for Israel are earmarked by Congress; the Administration usually does not request specific amounts of Refugee and Migration assistance for Israel.

Congress has changed the earmark language since the first refugee resettlement funds were appropriated in 1973. At first, the congressional earmark said the funds were for "resettlement in Israel of refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from Communist countries in Eastern Europe." But in 1985, the language was simplified to "refugees resettling in Israel" to ensure that Ethiopian Jews would be covered by the funding. Technically, the earmark designates funds for refugee resettlement, but in Israel little differentiation is made between "refugees" and other immigrants, and the funds are used to support the absorption of all immigrants.

²⁰ The Refugee and Migration Account (MRA) is authorized as part of the State Department funding but is appropriated through the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.

²¹ The Jewish Agency's website is available at [http://www.jafi.org.il/].

According to the FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, the FY2008 MRA request for Israel includes \$40 million to support a package of services designed to promote integration of approximately 11,500 migrants into Israeli society, including transportation to Israel, Hebrew language instruction, transitional housing, education, and vocational training.

Loan Guarantees

Overview. Since 1972, the United States has extended loan guarantees to Israel to assist with housing shortages, Israel's absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and its economic recovery following the 2000-2003 recession sparked by the renewal of Palestinian uprising. Loan guarantees are a form of indirect U.S. assistance to Israel, since they enable Israel to borrow from commercial sources at lower rates and not from the United States government. Congress directs that subsidies be set aside in a U.S. Treasury account for possible default. These subsidies, which are a percentage of the total loan (based in part on the credit rating of the borrowing country; in the case of the loan guarantees in the 1990s, the subsidy amount was 4.1%), have come from the U.S. or the Israeli government. Israel has never defaulted on a U.S.-backed loan guarantee, as it needs to maintain its good credit rating in order to secure financing to offset annual budget deficits.

Loan Guarantees for Economic Recovery. In 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon requested an additional \$8 billion in loan guarantees to help Israel's failing economy. The loan guarantee request accompanied a request for an additional \$4 billion in military grants to help Israel prepare for possible attacks during an anticipated U.S. war with Iraq and Israeli efforts to end the Palestinian uprising. P.L. 108-11, the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, included \$9 billion in loan guarantees over three years for Israel's economic recovery and \$1 billion in military grants. P.L. 108-11 stated that the proceeds from the loan guarantees could be used only within Israel's pre-June 1967 borders, that the annual loan guarantees could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel spends on settlements in the occupied territories, that Israel would pay all fees and subsidies, and that the President would consider Israel's economic reforms when determining terms and conditions for the loan guarantees. On November 26, 2003, the Department of State announced that the \$3 billion loan guarantees for FY2003 were reduced by \$289.5 million because Israel continued to build settlements in the occupied territories and continued construction of the security barrier separating the Israelis and Palestinians. No other deductions have been made.

P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Bill, first extended the authority of the loan guarantees from FY2005 to FY2007. In the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, President Bush stated that he would ask Congress to again extend the authorization of loan guarantees to Israel. P.L.109-472, the 2006 Department of State Authorities Act, extends the authority to provide loan guarantees through FY2010. Israel has not any borrowed funds since FY2005.

Table 3. Loan Guarantees for Economic Recovery

(\$ in millions)

Year	Authorized P.L. 108-11	Reduction for Settlement Activity	Amount Borrowed by Israel
FY2003	3,000	289.5	1,600
FY2004	3,000	_	1,750
FY2005	3,000/1,000*	_	750
FY2006	1,000		_
FY2007	1,000		_
Total	9,000	289.5	4,100
Year	Extended Authorization P.l.109-472**	Reduction for Settlement Activity	Amount Borrowed by Israel
FY2006	400	_	_
FY2007	400	_	_
FY2008	400	_	_
FY2009	400	_	_
FY2010	400	_	_
Total	2,000 (+ 2,600 unspent funds)	_	_

Source: U.S. State Department.

American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA)²²

Through Foreign Operations appropriations legislation, Congress has funded the ASHA program as part of the overall Development Assistance (DA) appropriation to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). According to USAID, ASHA is designed to strengthen self-sustaining schools, libraries and medical centers that best demonstrate American ideas and practices abroad. ASHA has been providing support to institutions in the Middle East since 1957, and there

^{*}Under the original authorizing legislation, Israel was permitted to borrow \$3 billion in FY2005. P.L. 108-447 extended the overall time frame for the loan guarantees, and the United States allotted \$1 billion increments for Israel to draw on in fiscal years 2005-2007.

^{**}From FY2003-FY2005, approximately \$4.6 billion in loan guarantees remained unspent by Israel. Of that amount, \$2.6 billion had been carried over from previous years and had already met certain financial benchmarks established by a Joint U.S.-Israeli Economic Group overseeing the loan guarantees. Because Israel has already met such criteria, it can draw on the \$2.6 billion at any time. The remaining \$2 billion in authorized loan guarantees has been apportioned out by the U.S. government in \$400 million increments from FY2006-FY2010.

²² According to USAID, recipients of ASHA grants on behalf of overseas institutions must be private U.S. organizations, headquartered in the United States, and tax-exempt. The U.S. organization must also serve as the founder for and/or sponsor of the overseas institution. Schools must be for secondary or higher education and hospital centers must conduct medical education and research outside the United States. Grants are made to U.S. sponsors for the exclusive benefit of institutions abroad. See [http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/asha/].

are a number of Israeli universities and hospitals that have been recipients of ASHA grants. Over the past several years, Israeli institutions, such as the Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem and the Hadassah Medical Organization, have received ASHA funding. The Hadassah Medical Organization was nominated for the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize for its equitable treatment of Palestinians and Israelis patients. According to USAID, institutions based in Israel have received the most program funding in the Middle East region.

Table 4. ASHA Program Grants to Israeli Institutions, FY2000-FY2005

Fiscal year	Amount
FY2000	\$2.75 million
FY2001	\$2.25 million
FY2002	\$2.65 million
FY2003	\$3.05 million
FY2004	\$3.15 million
FY2005	\$2.95 million
Total	\$16.8 million

Source: USAID.

U.S.-Israeli Scientific & Business Cooperation

In the early1970s, Israeli academics and businessmen began looking for ways to expand investment in Israel's high technology sector. At the time, Israel's nascent technology sector, which would later on become the driving force in Israel's economy, was in need of private capital for research and development. The United States and Israel launched several programs to stimulate Israeli industrial and scientific research, and Congress has on several occasions authorized and appropriated funds for the following organizations:

• The BIRD Foundation (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development Foundation). BIRD, which was established in 1977, provides matchmaking services between Israeli and American companies in the field of Research and Development with the goal of expanding cooperation between U.S. and Israeli private high tech industries.

²³ See [http://www.birdf.com/default.asp]. Congress helped establish BIRD's endowment with appropriations of \$30 million and \$15 million in 1977 and 1985 respectively. These grants were matched by the Israeli government for a total endowment of \$90 million

- The BSF Foundation (U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation).²⁴ BSF, which was started in 1972, promotes cooperation in scientific and technological research.
- The BARD Foundation (Binational Agriculture and Research and Development Fund). BARD was created in 1978 and supports U.S.-Israeli cooperation in agricultural research.²⁵

Section 917 of P.L.110-140, the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, contains the original language of the U.S.-Israel Energy Cooperation Act (H.R. 1838). Although it does not appropriate any funds for joint research and development, it does establish a grant program to support research, development, and commercialization of renewable energy or energy efficiency. The law also authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide funds for the grant program as needed.

Historical Background

1948-1970

U.S. government assistance to Israel began in 1949 with a \$100 million Export-Import Bank Loan.²⁶ For the next two decades, U.S. aid to Israel was modest and was far less than in later years.²⁷ Although the United States provided moderate amounts of economic aid (mostly loans), Israel's main early patron was France, which provided Israel with advanced military equipment and technology.²⁸ In 1962, Israel purchased its first advanced weapons system from the United States (Hawk

²⁴ See [http://www.bsf.org.il/Gateway4/]. Congress helped establish BSF's endowment with appropriations of \$30 million and \$20 million in 1972 and 1984 respectively. These grants were matched by Israel for a total endowment of \$100 million. According to the treaty establishing the Foundation, the Foundation shall use the interest, as well as any funds derived from its activities, for the operations of the Foundation.

²⁵ See [http://www.bard-isus.com/]. Congress helped establish BARD's endowment with appropriations of \$40 million and \$15 million in 1979 and 1985 respectively. These grants were matched by the State of Israel for a total endowment of \$110 million. In recent years, Congress has provided funds for BARD in annual Agriculture Appropriations legislation at approximately \$500,000 a year.

²⁶ In 1948, President Harry Truman, who sympathized with the plight of Israel in its early days, placed an arms embargo on Israel and her Arab neighbors in order to keep the United States neutral in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 reaffirmed U.S., British, and French opposition to the development of Arab-Israeli arms races.

²⁷ From 1949 through 1965, U.S. aid to Israel averaged about \$63 million per year, over 95% of which was economic development assistance and food aid. A modest military loan program began in 1959.

²⁸ France supplied Israel with military equipment mainly to counter Egypt. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Egypt antagonized France by providing arms and training for Algeria's war for independence against France.

antiaircraft missiles).²⁹ In 1968, a year after Israel's victory in the Six Day War in June 1967, the Johnson Administration, with strong support from Congress, approved the sale of Phantom aircraft to Israel, establishing the precedent for U.S. support for Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors.³⁰

1970-Present

Large-scale U.S. assistance for Israel increased considerably after Arab-Israeli wars created a sense among many Americans that Israel was continually under siege.³¹ Consequently, Congress, supported by broad U.S. public opinion, committed to strengthening Israel's military and economy through large increases in foreign aid. From 1966 through 1970, average aid per year increased to about \$102 million and military loans increased to about 47% of the total. In 1971, the United States provided Israel with military loans of \$545 million, up from \$30 million in 1970. Also in 1971, Congress first designated a specific amount of aid for Israel in legislation (an "earmark"). Economic assistance changed from project aid, such as support for agricultural development work, to a Commodity Import Program (CIP) for the purchase of U.S. goods. ³² In effect, the United States stepped in to fill the role that France had relinquished after French President Charles de Gaulle refused to supply Israel with military hardware to protest its preemptive launch of the Six Day War in June 1967. Israel became the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in 1974. From 1971 to the present, U.S. aid to Israel has averaged over \$2.6 billion per year, two-thirds of which has been military assistance.

1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. The 1979 Camp David Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. To facilitate a complete cessation of hostilities and Israel's return of the Sinai Peninsula, the United States provided a total of \$7.5 billion to both parties in 1979. The "Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979" (P.L. 96-35) provided military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3:2, respectively.³³

²⁹ "America's Staunchest Mideast Ally," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 21, 2003.

³⁰ Section 303 of P.L. 90-554, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1968*, expresses the sense of Congress to see the United States negotiate the sale of supersonic aircraft to Israel.

³¹ Between 1967 and 1973, Israel and its Arab neighbors fought the June 1967 War, the ensuing War of Attrition (1969), and the October 1973 War. Israel also was engaged in low level guerrilla warfare with the Palestinian Liberation Organization and other groups, which had bases in Jordan and later in Lebanon. The 1974 emergency aid for Israel, following the 1973 war, included the first U.S. military grant aid to Israel.

³² The Commodity Import Program for Israel ended in 1979 and was replaced with direct, largely unconditional cash transfers.

³³ This ratio is not found in the text of the 1978 and 1979 Camp David agreements. U.S. officials have not formally recognized the ratio. Egypt believes that, since it took political risks in making peace with Israel, the United States should be even-handed in its assistance policy to the region. The Egyptian government claims that a 3:2 ratio between Israel and Egypt was established during the negotiations.

Emergency Aid. U.S. assistance also has been used to help ease financial pressures on the Israeli treasury during recession.³⁴ In 1985, the United States significantly increased U.S. assistance to Israel, with Congress passing a special economic assistance package of \$1.5 billion in order to help the Israeli economy cope with soaring inflation and economic stagnation.³⁵ As part of the assistance agreement, the United States and Israel formed the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) in order to support Israeli economic reforms.³⁶ In addition, all U.S. military aid to Israel was converted into grants in 1985.³⁷ U.S. economic aid had been converted to a cash grant transfer in 1981.

During times of domestic unrest in Israel and regional instability, U.S. aid to Israel has increased. In 1991, Congress provided Israel \$650 million in emergency grants to pay for damage and other costs from Operation Desert Storm. In addition, Israel was given Patriot missiles to defend against Iraqi Scud missile attacks. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing increase in migration of Russian and other Eastern bloc Jews to Israel, Congress approved \$10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel to help it absorb immigrants and provide them with adequate social services. Finally, in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion, Congress passed the FY2003 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11), which included \$9 billion in loan guarantees over three years for Israel's economic recovery and \$1 billion in military grants.

Using Aid to Support the Peace Process. During the 1990s, the United States provided aid to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In late 1998, Israel requested \$1.2 billion in additional U.S. aid to fund the movement of troops and military installations out of areas of the West Bank as called for in the October 23, 1998 Wye Agreement.³⁸ The Clinton Administration requested \$1.2 billion in military aid for Israel to implement the Wye Agreement despite the fact that its implementation had stalled. President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2606, the FY2000 foreign operations appropriations bill, in part because it did not include the Wye funding. On

³⁴ Beginning in the mid-1970s, Israel could no longer meet its balance of payments and government deficits with imported capital (gifts from overseas Jews, West German reparations, U.S. aid) and began to rely more on borrowed capital. Growing debt servicing costs, mounting government social services expenditures, perennial high defense spending, and a stagnant domestic economy combined with worldwide inflation and declining foreign markets for Israeli goods pushed the Israeli economy into a near crisis situation in the mid-1980s.

³⁵ See Title I, Chapter V of P.L. 99-88, Economic Support Fund assistance for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. In 1985, the United States and Israel also concluded a Free Trade Agreement, which dramatically boosted Israeli exports to the United States.

³⁶ The JEDG meets on an annual basis to discuss financial sector and labor market reforms, trade liberalization, and privatization. The JEDG also monitors the disbursement of U.S. loan guarantees to Israel.

³⁷ The 1974 emergency aid for Israel, following the 1973 war, included the first military grant aid.

³⁸ The full text of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, a U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian security agreement, is available online at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/EE54A289-8F0A-4CDC-93C9-71BD631109AB.htm].

November 29, 1999, the President signed the consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. 3194 (P.L. 106-113), which included in Division B passage of H.R. 3422, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. Title VI of H.R. 3422 included the \$1.2 billion Wye funding for Israel.

Appendix: Recent Aid to Israel

Table 6 shows cumulative U.S. aid to Israel for FY1949 through FY1996, and U.S. aid to Israel for each fiscal year since. Detail for the years 1949-1996 is shown in **Table 7**.

Table 5. Recent U.S. Aid to Israel

(millions of dollars)

Year	Total	Military Grant	Economic Grant	Immig. Grant	ASHA	All other
1949-1996	68,030.9	29,014.9	23,122.4	868.9	121.4	14,903.3
1997	3,132.1	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.1	50.0
1998	3,080.0	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	?	?
1999	3,010.0	1,860.0	1,080.0	70.0	?	?
2000	4,131.85	3,120.0	949.1	60.0	2.75	?
2001	2,876.05	1,975.6	838.2	60.0	2.25	?
2002	2,850.65	2,040.0	720.0	60.0	2.65	28.0
2003	3,745.15	3,086.4	596.1	59.6	3.05	?
2004	2,687.25	2,147.3	477.2	49.7	3.15	9.9
2005	2,612.15	2,202.2	357.0	50.0	2.95	?
2006	2,534.5	2,257.0	237.0	40.0	?	0.5
2007	2,500.2	2,340.0	120.0	40.0	?	0.2
Total	101,190.8	53,643.4	30,897.0	1,518.2	140.3	14,991.9

Notes: ESF was earmarked for \$960 million for FY2000 but was reduced to meet a 0.38% recision. FY2000 military grants include \$1.2 billion for the Wye agreement and \$1.92 billion in annual military aid. Final amounts for FY2003 are reduced by 0.65% mandated recision, and final amounts for FY2004 are reduced by 0.59%.

The \$600 million in housing loan guarantees, \$5.5 billion in military debt reduction loan guarantees, \$9.2 billion in Soviet Jew resettlement loan guarantees, and \$9 billion in economic recovery loan guarantees are not included in the tables because the United States government did not transfer funds to Israel. The United States underwrote loans to Israel from commercial institutions.

Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Israel, FY1949-FY1996 (millions of dollars)

Year	Total	Military Loan	Military Grant	Economic Loan	Economic Grant	FFP Loan	FFP Grant
1949	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
1950	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1951	35.1	-	1	-	0.1	-	-
1952	86.4	-	_	-	63.7	-	22.7
1953	73.6	-	-	-	73.6	-	*
1954	74.7	-	1	-	54.0	-	20.7
1955	52.7	1	ī	20.0	21.5	10.8	0.4
1956	50.8	1	ī	10.0	14.0	25.2	1.6
1957	40.9	1	ī	10.0	16.8	11.8	2.3
1958	85.4	1	I	15.0	9.0	34.9	2.3
1959	53.3	0.4	I	10.0	9.2	29.0	1.7
1960	56.2	0.5	ı	15.0	8.9	26.8	4.5
1961	77.9	*	ı	16.0	8.5	13.8	9.8
1962	93.4	13.2	I	45.0	0.4	18.5	6.8
1963	87.9	13.3	1	45.0	-	12.4	6.0
1964	37.0	-	-	20.0	-	12.2	4.8
1965	65.1	12.9	1	20.0	-	23.9	4.9
1966	126.8	90.0	I	10.0	-	25.9	0.9
1967	23.7	7.0	1	5.5	-	1	0.6
1968	106.5	25.0	-	-	-	51.3	0.5
1969	160.3	85.0	-	-	-	36.1	0.6
1970	93.6	30.0	-	-	-	40.7	0.4
1971	634.3	545.0	-	-	-	55.5	0.3
1972	430.9	300.0	-	-	50.0	53.8	0.4
1973	492.8	307.5	-	-	50.0	59.4	0.4
1974	2,621.3	982.7	1,500.0	-	50.0	-	1.5
1975	778.0	200.0	100.0	-	344.5	8.6	-
1976	2,337.7	750.0	750.0	225.0	475.0	14.4	*
TQ	292.5	100.0	100.0	25.0	50.0	3.6	-
1977	1,762.5	500.0	500.0	245.0	490.0	7.0	-
1978	1,822.6	500.0	500.0	260.0	525.0	6.8	-
1979	4,888.0	2,700.0	1,300.0	260.0	525.0	5.1	-
1980	2,121.0	500.0	500.0	260.0	525.0	1.0	-
1981	2,413.4	900.0	500.0	-	764.0	-	-
1982	2,250.5	850.0	550.0	-	806.0	-	-
1983	2,505.6	950.0	750.0	-	785.0	-	-
1984	2,631.6	850.0	850.0	-	910.0	-	-
1985	3,376.7	-	1,400.0	-	1,950.0	-	
1986	3,663.5	-	1,722.6	-	1,898.4	-	-
1987 1988	3,040.2	-	1,800.0	-	1,200.0	-	-
	3,043.4	-	1,800.0	-	1,200.0	-	-
1989	3,045.6	-	1,800.0	-	1,200.0	-	_
1990 1991	3,034.9	-	1,792.3	-	1,194.8	-	-
1991	3,712.3	-	1,800.0	-	1,850.0	-	_
1992	3,100.0	-	1,800.0	-	1,200.0	-	-
1993	3,103.4	-	1,800.0	-	1,200.0 1,200.0	-	_
1994	3,097.2 3,102.4	-	1,800.0 1,800.0	-	1,200.0	-	_
1995	3,144.0	-	1,800.0	-	1,200.0	-	_
Total	68,030.9	11,212.5	29,014.9	1,516.5	23,122.4	588.5	94.1
Tutai	00,030.9	11,414.5	47,014.9	1,510.5	23,122.4	300.3	74.1

Year	Ex-Im. JewishRefug. Bank Resettle Loan Grant		Amer. Schools & Hosp.Grant	Other Loan	Coop.Deve l. Grant	Other Grant	
1949	100.0	-	-	_	_	_	
1950	-	_	-	_	_	_	
1951	35.0	_	_	_	_	_	
1952	-	_	-	_	_	_	
1953	_	_		_	_	_	
1954	_	_	-	_	_	_	
1955	_	_	-	_	_	_	
1956	_	-	_	_	-	-	
1957	_	-	-	-	-	-	
1958	24.2	_	-	_	_	_	
1959	3.0	_	_	_	_	-	
1960	0.5	_	-	_	_	_	
1961	29.8			_	_	_	
1962	9.5	-	-	_	_		
1962	11.2			-	-		
1963	11.2	-	-	-	-	-	
	- 2.4	-	-	-	-	-	
1965	3.4	-	-	-	-	-	
1966	- 0.6	-	- 1.0	-	-	-	
1967	9.6	-	1.0	-	-	-	
1968	23.7	-	6.0	-	-	-	
1969	38.6	-	- 12.5	-	-	-	
1970	10.0	-	12.5	-	-	-	
1971	31.0	-	2.5	-	-	-	
1972	21.1	-	5.6	-	-	-	
1973	21.1	50.0	4.4	-	-	-	
1974	47.3	36.5	3.3	-	-	-	
1975	62.4	40.0	2.5	-	-	20.0	
1976	104.7	15.0	3.6	-	-	-	
TQ	12.6	-	1.3	-	-	-	
1977	0.9	15.0	4.6	-	-	-	
1978	5.4	20.0	5.4	-	-	-	
1979	68.7	25.0	4.2	-	-	-	
1980	305.9	25.0	4.1	-	-	-	
1981	217.4	25.0	2.0	-	5.0	-	
1982	6.5	12.5	3.0	17.5	5.0	-	
1983	-	12.5	3.1	-	5.0	-	
1984	-	12.5	4.1	-	5.0	-	
1985	-	15.0	4.7	-	7.0	-	
1986	15.0	12.0	5.5	-	10.0	-	
1987	-	25.0	5.2	-	10.0	-	
1988	_	25.0	4.9	-	13.5	-	
1989	-	28.0	6.9	-	10.7	-	
1990	-	29.9	3.5	-	14.4	-	
1991	_	45.0	2.6	-	14.7	-	
1992	-	80.0	3.5	-	16.5	-	
1993	-	80.0	2.5	-	20.9	-	
1994	_	80.0	2.7	-	14.5	-	
1995	-	80.0	2.9	-	19.5	-	
1996		80.0	3.3	-	14.0	50.0	
Total	1218.5	868.9	121.4	17.5	185.7	70.0	

Notes:

* = less than \$50,000

- = None

NA = Not Available

TQ = Transition Quarter, when the U.S. fiscal year changed from June to September.

FFP = Food for Peace

Cooperative Development Grant: Three programs are in the cooperative development category: Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) intended for projects that foster economic growth and economic cooperation between Israel and its neighbors; Cooperative Development Program (CDP); and the Cooperative Development Research (CDR), both of which fund Israel's foreign aid program. Israel received about one half of the \$94 million MERC, and all of the \$53 million CDP and \$39 million CDR.

"Other Loan" is a CCC loan. "Other Grants" are \$20 million in 1975 for a seawater desalting plant and \$50 million in 1996 for anti-terrorism.

Definition of Aid: Under the category of foreign aid, some people include other funds transferred to Israel, such as the \$180 million for research and development of the Arrow missile, or the \$7.9 billion in loan guarantees for housing or settling Soviet Jews in Israel. None of these funds is included in this table.